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(On legal sized double space) 
The Nurnberg Verdict, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 858 
(1947) 
 
^check carefully^ Bibliograph from note 3, 
p.858; Note 1, p.857 
 
I.M.T. found that there was planning to wage 
wars at least as early as Nov. 5, 1937 and 
probably before that. Opinion 16, 34 
 
ImT specifically found that the war initiated 
against Poland on Sept. 1, 1939, was an 
aggressive war which developed in due course, 
on the basis of systematic preparation, into 
further aggressive wars which embraced almost 
the whole world. Opinion 34 
 
IMT found that Austria was occupied pursuant 
to a common plan of aggression, opinion 21-
24,145. 
 
IMT found that Bohemia & Moravia were 
occupied by (over) 
 
 
  
military force. Opinion 24-27, 160. Such 
findings were necessary to sustain the 
conviction of von Schirach and von Neurath of 
Crimes against Humanity in the respective 
countries. (Harvard Law Rev. Note 48) 
 
IMT found "Continued planning, with 
(CROSSED OUT the) aggressive war as the 
objective, has been established beyond doubt. 
 
IMT convicted 8 defendants and acquitted 
fourteen of participation in the common plan. 
Of the eight convicted, four were military men 
(Goering, Keitel Raeder, & Jodl), two foreign 
ministers (von Neurath and Ribbentrop) and 
two high in Nazi circles (Hess and Rosenberg) 
 
  
The most significant thing (CROSSED 
OUT about the) achievement of the Nurenberg 
verdict is that it emphasized the basic 
determination of the Charter: that aggressive 
war is a crime and all who participate in a 
conspiracy to that end are answerable. Harvard 
Law Rev p. 868. 
 
(CROSSED OUT IMT evidenced) 
 
IMT seemed to adopt view 
(a) that criminal statutes are to be 
interpreted restrictively; 
(b) lack of sympathy for the conspiracy 
concept. 
 
Importance of getting at the substance of 
things. 
 
Refutation of the coincidence argument. 
In the IMT Goering (Tr. 12976, July 4) argued 
that the defendants had never conspired 
together; and that some were not originally 
 
 
members, while others had (CROSSED OUT 
been) long been high officials of the party. 
Jackson's reply; "It contradicts experience that 
this was merely a coincidence that men of such 
diverse backgrounds and talents should so 
forward each other's aims." They all had 
different roles because of the grand nature of 
the enterprise. But all made "integrated and 
necessary contributions to the joint 
undertaking...The activities off all these 
defendants...blend together into one consistent 
and militant pattern animated by a common 
objective to reshape the (CROSSED OUT 
may) map of Europe by force of arms." 
Harvard Law Rev. p. 870 The  
 
(CROSSED OUT The standard set in the 
Harvard ley Law Rev. Article the IMT is) 
 
 
IMT standard which we must apply is to 
inquire whether the defendants, with knowledge 
of Hitler's aims, gave him their cooperation – 
(opinion pp. 55-56) This is the standard to judge 
participation in the common plan. But as to what 
constitutes (CROSSED OUT the plan) a 
common plan, the IMT rejected the prosecutions 
broad theory. *The IMT said that (CROSSED 
OUT the conspiracy mus) a conspiracy to wage 
aggressive war must be clearly outlined in its 
purpose with a concrete plan to wage war as its 
subject. 
Further must not be too far removed from the 
time of decision and action. The Tribunal must 
examine whether a concrete plan to wage war 
existed, and determine the participants in that 
concrete plan. (Opinion pp.50-55, Harvard Law 
Rev. p. 871) 
 
(But it can be argued that this was only rejecting 
the broad conception of conspiracy that any 
significant participation in the affairs of the Nazi 
party or government was criminal – it is not in 
point as to specific acts of participation here 
charged. 
 
 
The prosecution in (CROSSED OUT effect) 
substance was arguing that the Nazi 
government itself was an open conspiracy and 
that any one who participated in it was guilty. 
It does not follow that the (CROSSED OUT 
plan in which) phases of the plan in which 
these defendants participated is not concrete or 
^not^ clearly outlined in its criminal purpose) 
Hebert 
 
  
But even accepting the IMT's restricted 
definition of conspiracy – does it follow that 
the [CROSSED OUT defendants wer 14 
defendants] acquittal of 14 defendants was 
fairly justifiable under the evidence? 
Note IMT found that a common plan to 
prepare and wage war existed probably before 
November, 1937 – that plan was clearly 
outlined in its criminal purpose and not too far 
removed from the time of action. So query did 
not of these fourteen defendants cooperate in 
that common plan with knowledge of its aims? 
Harvard Law Rev. 872 
 
(Hebert Note: If IMT decided that there was 
common planning to war i.e. conspiracy 
possibly prior to Nov, 1937, [CROSSED OUT 
a time at which the definite decisions to attack] 
does it not follow that plan to attack a specific 
country is not a necessary element – plan to 
wage war if and wherever necessary 
 
  
to achieve political objectives will suffice – 
whole question therefore turns on knowledge 
which in turns means knowledge of what? See 
analysis below of Shalcht's case) 
 
Uniform defense in IMT was lack of 
knowledge that aggressive war was 
contemplated. (That will be the uniform defense 
in our case.) 
 
Keitel argued that the military supported 
Hitler in rejecting the noarmament provisions of 
the Treaty of Versailles but that he did not 
forsee the danger of aggressive war because 
rearmament was not adequate for such a war 
even in 1939. (Krauch makes substantially same 
contention.) 
Schacht argued that he could not be charged 
with having more knowledge that the 
rearmament was aggressive than Keitel and 
Keitel ^contended that he^ could not be held 
more accountable than the sophisticated 
Schacht, who had been Plenipotentiary for War 
Economy. (All Farben defendants contend that 
they cannot be held more 
 
  
accountable for knowledge of the aggressive 
character of the rearmament than the acquitted 
IMT defendants – See motion to dismiss 
*** 
(A major difficulty is the contention that 
Hitler's protestations of peaceful intentions 
were widely believed. High Allied leaders had 
stated belief in Hitler's peaceful intentions. 
Mightn't defendant's have believed that 
[CROSSED OUT Hitler w] was bluffing and 
would not make war? But weren't defendants, 
by virtue of their positions and [CROSSED 
OUT know] nature of the war production in a 
better position to [CROSSED OUT judge] 
determine the true aims of Hitler? 
This interjects a doubtful note in the evidence 
in IMT case.-) Harvard Law Review article, 
p.873 points out that –"xx the gaps in the 
evidence had not all been filled. Except for the 
notes of the key conferences with Hitler, there 
were few documents definitely linking the non-
military defendants with preparation for a 
specific war." The prosecution, therefore, 
asked 
 
  
the Tribunal to infer knowledge and intimated 
the use of an objective standard, i.e., that 
defendants either knew or are chargeable with 
knowledge that the war for which they were 
making ready would be a war of German 
aggression. (Harvard L. Rev. p. 873) 
 
"The Tribunal, however, insisted on being 
shown that the defendant did, in fact know. In 
some few instances it was willing to infer 
substantive knowledge." (Hebert Note: This is 
substantially my position as to the Farben 
defendants.) "It inferred that Hess discussed 
war plans in conference with Hitler." (Query: 
Am I willing to infer that Krauch discussed 
war plans in conferences with Goering? But is 
it necessary to infer when the evidence shows 
that Krauch told Goering in substance that the 
figures were no good for making war? Isn't that 
enough?) 
 
  
"It inferred that Fink knew, or deliberately 
closed his eyes to the fact, that his Reichs bank 
was the recipient of the personal belongings of 
concentration camp victims. But as a general 
standard the requirement of actual knowledge 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt was 
maintained." 
This requirement is exceedingly difficult 
to maintain in the case of the non-military 
defendant. "In the absence of direct evidence 
of participating in the planning, and inference 
of actual knowledge could be drawn only from 
such unusual circumstances as existed in the 
case of Hess. The contradictory nature of Nazi 
propaganda, now belligerent, now conciliatory, 
and the ever-present claim that rearmament 
was to "defend" Germany from its neighbors 
made it easy for defense counsel to stress the 
naiveté of their clients." (Harvard Law Rev. 
p873) 
 
  
"To show their knowledge and to establish when 
they joined the conspiracy present an almost 
insolvable problem of proof." 
 
Schacht's case - none of the defendants had 
made a greater contribution toward increasing 
Germany's war potential. By 1937 he had 
financed the vigorous rearmament program and 
actively organized German economy for ware. 
But rearmament is not a crime - must be ^carried 
out^ part of the Nazi plan to wage aggressive war. 
Did Schacht know he was helping Hitler on the 
road to war? Schacht was acquitted because the 
necessary inference of knowledge of the Nazi 
aggressive plans was not established beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
*** What is mean by knowledge of "Nazi 
aggressive plans" here? Does it mean knowledge 
of preparations for war against a particular 
country - that is does it mean concrete plans for a 
specific aggression? (Defense motion raises this 
and we will have to pass on this question -) 
Does it mean [CROSSED OUT Harvard Law 
Review] knowledge of ultimate aggression in the 
event Germany's demands were not satisfied? 
(This is 
 
  
the position I take - "Knowledge of Hitler's 
aims" - "Knowledge of the Nazi aggressive 
plans" means knowledge that aggression will be 
the result if German demands are not satisfied. 
 
Harvard Law Review Says: "It is possible 
that the Tribunal based the acquittal (of Schacht) 
solely on a ruling that general knowledge, 
unaccompanied by knowledge of preparations 
for war at a specific time against a specific 
country, was insufficient in law. Such a doctrine 
would seem indefensible. The prosecution 
contended, however, that Schacht had 
knowledge of, and participated in, planning and 
preparing for ultimate aggression in the event 
that Germany's demands were not satisfied. 
There are indications in the opinion that the 
Tribunal - after acquitting Schacht under Count 
One because, even were the prosecution's theory 
adopted, it had not been established beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Schacht knew of general 
plans for aggressive war. If that was its view, the 
Tribunal's conclusion 
 
  
that such knowledge on Schacht's part was 
note established is difficult to support." 
(Harvard Law Review p. 875) 
 
(The above quotation supports the view 
that knowledge of general plans for aggressive 
war or knowledge of ultimate aggression in the 
event Germany's demands are not satisfied is 
sufficient knowledge to create criminal 
responsibility for participation in the common 
plan or conspiracy to wage aggressive ware. It 
should also be noted that this passage and note 
76 to the Article, support the view that Count 
two (similar to our count one) charged as 
aggressive the attacks on Poland and 
subsequent invasions & that Schacht had not 
participated in these. Under our count one we 
must determine whether there was 
participation etc in the specific aggressive wars 
[CROSSED OUT dealt with] enumerated in 
paragraph 2 of the indictment.) 
 
  
(quote Harvard Law Rev Article as marked on 
pp. 875-879) 
 
 
 
(It is my view that aggression can be planned 
with the number two man as well as with the 
No.1 man - this means that Krauch could plan 
aggressive war with Goering with out 
knowledge of specific plans to wage 
aggressive wars against specific countries 
provided that he knows the aim is ultimate 
aggression. There is no reason to hold that 
[CROSSED OUT principals in] participants 
the common plan must be at the Hitler level.) 
 
  
Von Papen 
Crucial question was whether he knew of 
the plans to occupy Austria by force, if 
necessary. From the evidence concerning von 
Papen's activities, probable knowledge of these 
plans, or at least familiarity with the Nazi 
aggressive aims, might be inferred. An 
application of a standard of subjective 
knowledge, coupled with the necessity of 
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, had 
led to Schacht's acquittal. 
 
Speer 
 
Did not become a top Nazi official until 
1942 after all aggressive wars had been 
initiated. After 1942 his position in many 
respects in relation to armament was similar to 
that of Schacht in the rearmament years. The 
IMT found that "his activities in charge of 
German armament production 
 
  
were in aid of the war effort in the same way 
that other productive enterprises aid in the 
waging of war" and were not part of the 
common plan within count one.  
(Can't this be explained on a ground that 
the 
purposes of the common plan had been 
consummated - all aggressive wars had been 
launched)  
Other acquitted defendants had less 
knowledge that Schacht - Frick, Frank & von 
Schirach. 
 
quote p. 881 as marked 
 
  
Harvard L. Rev. p 881 - "Count one, which 
embodied the common plan, and Count Two, 
which charged the defendants with 
participation in the planning, preparation, 
initiation and waging of specific aggressive 
wars in violation of international treaties, were 
interrelated and to a large extent overlapping, 
The Tribunal felt, without, without expressly 
so stating, that knowledge of definite 
aggressive intentions sufficed for conviction 
under Count One, even if the defendant had 
idea who would be the ultimate victim of the 
aggression. Under Count Two, however, the 
allegations of the indictment were limited to 
twelve specific aggressions; therefore, 
 
  
knowledge of the specific plans to invade one 
of the enumerated countries had to be shown.  
(Note: IMT indictment charged the 
defendants with initiating war against Poland, 
the United Kingdom, and France in Sept. 1939, 
and other wars thereafter, ending with the war 
against the United States. Reference was made 
to Count one for allegations that the wars were, 
in fact, aggressive, and the proof as to this was 
offered under Count One. The proof under 
Count Two was thus limited to setting forth the 
treaties agreements, and assurances. These are 
set [CROSSED OUT out] forth in Appendix C 
of the indictment and discussed in the opinion 
at 46-54. The Tribunal made no finding on the 
initiation of war against the United Kingdom 
and France 
 
  
"But the test of whether the function was of 
vital importance in the war was not the sole 
contention. Despite Speer's considerable 
importance as head of the German armament 
ministry, the Tribunal stated that the type of 
aid given to the war effort by "productive 
enterprises" did not constitute "waging" ware. 
The Ultimate test of responsibility under Count 
Two, then seems to have been the importance 
of the activity plus and "aggressive" 
characteristic of the activity - reaching out into 
the war or zone of occupation." (Query: Can I 
accept that in my thinking? It seems 
anomalous to convict on waging war alone - 
after war is on they were doing theer duty as 
private citizens in response to orders of the 
state.") 
 
  
(But this is hard to harmonize with the 
conviction of Frick & Seyss-Ignant who were 
convicted of waging aggressive war - because 
they administered occupied territory of vital 
importance in the aggressive war being waged 
by Germany.) 
 
Harvard L Rev. Conclusion p. 903. - In future 
trials for Crimes against Peace the prosecution 
would be handicapped if it were confined to 
limits set in the opinion. If industrialists were 
among the defendants, the prosecution would 
be faced with a ruling that "production" is no 
part of the crime of waging war. It would be 
faced with the need of proof, a fatal omission 
in the Schacht case, that rearmament was 
carried out with actual knowledge 
 
  
of aggressive war plans. 
(Note 203. The exent to which the 
Nuernberg verdict will be followed as a 
precedent may be shown by the pending case 
against the 
I. G. Farben officials, U.S. v. Krauch. The first 
count of the indictment charges preparation 
and waging of aggressive warfare. The issue is 
whether Farben's executives knew that the war 
was to be one of aggression. the same question 
must be faced in connection with Farben's 
efforts to weaken the United States and Great 
Britain through cartel agreements, propaganda, 
intelligence and espionage activities. The other 
counts charge plunder and spoliation, slavery 
and mass murder, membership in the SS as to 
certain defendants, and a common 
 
 
  
plan or conspiracy to commit Crimes against 
Peace as defined in Allied Control Council 
Law No. 10. x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x “ 
 
page 905 - Like any precedent the Nurnberg 
opinion is susceptible to interpretation and 
development. 
(1) Another tribunal may fuel that knowledge 
of aggressive intentions may be inferred from 
an individual's position and his ability to learn 
the facts; or 
(2) Or it may distinguish an "open" conspiracy, 
as in this case where the German Government 
with its manifold preparations was patently 
headed for war, from a conspiracy where the 
leading figures develop programs for 
aggression in secret. In the latter case, it may 
be argued, the 
 
 
customary rules of Anglo-American law 
should apply. The case of "open" conspiracy 
where, the common plan is co-extensive with 
the ruling political group, would seem to be 
more within the preventative realm of the 
United Nations Security Council, which can 
keep informed and take necessary action; than 
the province of a criminal court. 
